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A Zoopolean look at animal
research ethics

ABSTRACT
I will discuss how animal laboratory research can be ethically analyzed using Donaldson and Kymlicka’s political theory of animal
rights. To accomplish this, I will not presuppose their strong animal rights framework. Donaldson and Kymlicka’s approach revolves
around some basic human-animal relationships, reflecting the relational turn in applied ethics writ large. However, they do not discuss
laboratory animal research in any detail, and so an extension to that
domain of animal use is in order. Donaldson and Kymlicka’s emphasis on human-animal relationships is useful for reminding ourselves
that in laboratories various staff or personnel can develop bonds with
captive animals that make it difficult to follow certain protocols as
well as create a deep and lasting negative impression. Though, when
suitably modified, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s political theory can
apply to animal research ethics, it can only do so if we ask more from
all members of our society.
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Introduction
The use of nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals) in harmful research or testing is an ongoing flashpoint in animal ethics
(Knight 2011; Rollin 2012). Their use in invasive studies, particularly those that cause, or are expected to cause, extreme pain or
distress (CCAC 1991) give rise to profound moral difficulties (Rollin 2009). Beyond these issues of direct harm, the housing conditions (e.g., whether they are alone or in social housing), origins
(e.g., captive breeding versus animal shelters or wild caught), and
taxon identity (e.g., rodents versus domestic cats, domestic dogs,
or macaques) of research animals are each associated with significant moral issues (Orlans 2002; Schuppli, Fraser, and McDonald
2004). Though it is not uncommon to have animal research ethics
pay little attention to the moral significance of the species used
(particularly if they are not apes) and pay even less attention to
how odd this looks given the moral preeminence of one above all
others ostensibly because of specific, morally significant, speciestypical though not unique capacities, a cursory understanding of
the psychological capacities of nonhuman primates like macaques
(Thierry 2011) or the depth of the bond that domestic cats can
share with human care-givers (Bernstein 2007) suggest a compromised moral compass.
I will examine how Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s Zoopolean framework, most completely set out in Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011), provides another opportunity to reset our compasses. Their approach
revolves around some basic human-animal relationships (particularly, those in our homes or communities), the importance of such
relationships in the lives of many people who work hard to care
for companion animals and advocate on behalf of various animals
in captivity, and the potency of these relationships to give rise to
positive duties. As Donaldson and Kymlicka note, animal rights
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theories have typically emphasized negative duties but provided
little guidance for those of us who take on care responsibilities for
the animals in our lives. Their framework sets out to correct this
lacuna (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011).
For reasons that will become clear in what follows, I will not be
engaging Donaldson and Kymlicka’s unmodified framework. The
next section will set out the parameters of my discussion, including how I will engage their Zoopolean vision. I will focus on animal research ethics, particularly the intersection of positive reinforcement training and a dissent approach I have been developing
in other work (though it will be compatible with the approaches
taken in DeGrazia (2007) and Sapontzis (1987) and perhaps also
Kantin and Wendler (2015)). I do so for several reasons. I suspect
that some of the considerations that shape Donaldson and Kymlicka’s discussions of our positive duties to other animals can help us
re-envision how research animals are regarded or treated. Donaldson and Kymlicka intentionally do not discuss laboratory animal
research in any detail (e.g., see pp.43-44 of Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011)), and so an extension to that domain of animal use is
in order. Donaldson and Kymlicka’s emphasis on human-animal
relationships is useful for reminding ourselves that in biomedical
laboratories various staff or personnel can develop bonds with the
animals for whom they care, and that this can make it difficult for
them to follow certain protocols as well as deeply and negatively
affect them (Coleman 2010; Iliff 2002). Cooperative animals are
happier animals, and this can make a difference in the daily lives
of laboratory staff and personnel. In the end I hope to show how a
Zoopolean framework can apply to animal research ethics, though
only if we ask more from all members of our society.
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Framing considerations
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s framework is based on a strong animal rights foundation and so requires a significant sea-change in
commonly held moral views of other animals, if it is to be applied
as they envision. However, they have suggested that their framework can be useful to those who reject such a rights position (see
p.21 of Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011)) and I aim to explore that
claim here. I adopt three other framing considerations, all taken
from Zoopolis. First, revolutionary thought about human-animal
relations, which foreground considerations of moral equality and
inviolable rights, has had some impact on our various animal use
practices but failed to garner widespread support. Presumably,
appealing to attitudes and values that are already widely, though
perhaps not yet universally, held is preferable. Second, as already
mentioned, there are positive as well as negative duties to other
animals of moral concern. Third, our various relationships with
these animals determine our negative and positive duties (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011).
As I will not assume a strong animal rights position in what follows, I will not assume that animals have such inviolable rights as
a right to life, liberty, and a life free of torture. This is what allows
me to explore the implications of a (diluted) Zoopolean framework
for some areas of animal use rejected by Donaldson and Kymlicka, including harmful research. As we will see, we must ask more
of each other to usefully bring to bear such a framework. Nevertheless, I will indicate how these changes cohere with widely held
attitudes or values.
For Donaldson and Kymlicka, most zoo conditions/settings
and captive, including (presumably all) invasive, studies are morally impermissible (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011). My position,
which focuses on laboratory animal use, will be more permissive.
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Though this claim can be easily overstated, there is public support
for animal research, even where it harms the animals used (Ipsos
MORI 2016; Joffe et al. 2016). Though a sound ethical framework
is not decided by popular vote (we will return to that thought later),
popular support is required for sustained, widespread changes in
our relationships with other animals.
That said, for the sake of this discussion I accept that animal
research should be constrained by various ethical considerations.
This is in step with current discussions of animal research ethics commonly articulated through a commitment to the 3Rs of
Replacement, Reduction, and Refinement and can be justified
by a rather conservative commitment to avoiding unnecessary
harm (Fenwick, Griffin, and Gauthier 2009). For our purposes
here, Replacement prescribes replacing sentient animals with
non-sentient models when such alternative models can be as effectively used, Reduction prescribes using the minimal numbers
of animals needed in a given study to achieve statistically significant results, and Refinement prescribes reducing or eliminating
scientifically unnecessary or avoidable stress or distress (Prescott
2017). Typically, what will qualify as scientifically necessary
harm is determined by what is required to advance knowledge,
practice, or safety (though the use of animals in pedagogical contexts in which they are, or have been, harmed is a contested area).
I also accept that the 3Rs do not exhaust our ethical obligations
to animals used, or the issues arising from their use, in research,
teaching, or testing—a view championed by the likes of Orlans as
well as Schuppli, Fraser, and McDonald (Orlans 2002; Schuppli,
Fraser, and McDonald 2004). Issues not directly impacted by a 3R
framework include transparency in disclosing negative as well as
positive results arising from the use of particular animal models
(for a dissenting view, see de Boo et al 2005), sourcing animals
used in science, the typical permissibility of research associated
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with extreme distress or suffering, and the use of certain species
(e.g., macaques or domestic dogs) in research that harms them.
As some of these considerations (e.g., greater transparency, stronger restrictions on sourcing research animals, at least curtailing
research causing extreme distress and suffering) can be justified
by a relevantly similar conservative commitment to avoiding unnecessary harm (Orlans 2002), I will consider these considerations
to be as justified as the 3Rs. The issues surrounding the use of
certain species will intersect with some of my later arguments.

Transitional animal research ethics
A number of animal bioethicists are pushing nonhuman primate research ethics in the direction of greater integration with
human research ethics. Examples include efforts to defend a reseeing of nonhuman primates as vulnerable subjects (Johnson and
Barnard (2014) focus primarily on chimpanzees), restricting primate research using appeals to minimal or slightly greater than
minimal risk (Ferdowsian and Fuentes 2014), or foregrounding the
dissent or consent capacities of the relevant nonhuman primates
(Fenton 2012; 2014; Wendler 2014). Importantly for this discussion, these efforts need not depend on revolutionary ethical commitments. For example, a narrow moral gaze directed at the use of
nonhuman primates in harmful research can be motivated by their
phylogenetic proximity to humans. On sliding-scale views of moral status, that appear to underwrite much of the animal research
ethics used by proponents of animal research (Fenton 2012), there
is a recognition that the more human-like other animals are, the
more negative and positive duties accrue to those who use them
in harmful ways (and, of course, vice versa) (DeGrazia 2002).
A biological turn in understanding human psychological capacities, including those that are ethically relevant (e.g., sentience,
self-awareness, intentional social engagement), can strengthen the
relevant imperatives. Though there is much that is wrong-headed
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in the typical sliding-scale approach (particularly, in light of the
ethical irrelevancy of mere species identity (Andrews et al 2019),
a point we will return to shortly), it reminds us that one can problematize the use of some animals in harmful research without implications for all of the animals so used. Such a restricted inclusive
ethics can permit a move forward in the use of animals in science
(in the form of greater restrictions or curtailment) even within
communities resistant to general nonhuman moral equality.
Efforts to push animal research ethics closer to its human counterpart do not just promise a more positive outcome for the primates or other animals (Rollin 2012) so used. Those laboratory researchers, staff, and technicians deeply concerned about the wellbeing of the animals used in their laboratories will benefit from a
framework that curtails the use of these subjects in ways that are
distressing to witness, maintain, or execute. It is also well known
that various laboratory stressors can affect the validity of the results gained from animal studies. A more humane space, in such
circumstances, can yield better scientific results (Coleman 2010).
A fly in the ointment
All is not well (or good enough) in such approaches without
modifying the background analyses of moral status. As an example case, consider the use of positive reinforcement training (PRT)
in laboratory settings. At first glance, PRT represents a significant leap forward in the humane treatment of animals in research.
What it seeks to secure is an animal’s cooperation and to avoid or
reduce the use of negative reinforcement (NR), punishment, or restraints (Laule, Bloomsmith, and Schapiro 2003; Wolfensohn and
Lloyd 2013).
PRT, as the name implies, makes use of rewards (positive reinforcers (PR)) to train animals to behave in desirable ways. This
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contrasts with both NR and punishment. NR uses the introduction and timed removal (‘response-sensitive’ removal) of aversive
stimuli or diminishment of aversive states (e.g., hunger or thirst)
to train animals to behave in desirable ways. Punishment will also
use aversive stimuli to train animals, but the punishment is directed at animals who do not respond in desirable ways (Rennie
and Buchanan-Smith 2006).
Both reinforcement training approaches are superior to punishment for the primary reason that it is not an effective way to
train another animal. Any cost-benefit analysis that uses the conservative commitment to avoiding unnecessary harm mentioned
above, will, on this consideration alone, favor either PRT or negative reinforcement training (NRT). There are good reasons to favor the positive form, however. Imagine that PRT and NRT are
equally effective (though for the record, PRT tends to be more effective (Wolfensohn and Lloyd 2013)). NRT, by its very nature,
uses stressors to shape animal behavior. As stressors are in some
sense harmful (Laule, Bloomsmith, and Schapiro 2003), PRT is to
be favored on the conservative grounds mentioned above. What’s
more, many laboratory animals can recognize individuals, so it is
also reasonable to expect that individuals who are more readily
associated with negative reinforcers will elicit stress responses. As
being non-threatening to laboratory animals is an effective way to
avoid unnecessary harm and can facilitate handling for such laboratory procedures as injections, PRT should be preferred (Schuppli
et al 2004). Since the nature of the relationships (e.g., whether they
are caring or respectful) between laboratory researchers, staff, and
technicians and the animals they use are integral to a Zoopolean
framework (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011), favoring procedures
with positive valence for the animals concerned should be preferred.
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Donaldson and Kymlicka do not hold PRT in high regard and not
merely because of their disapproval of harmful animal research.
They see this type of training as essentially coercive (Donaldson
and Kymlicka 2011). Several reasonable considerations can be offered in defense of their view. A more positive reward is likely to
be more effective (e.g., keeping the animal’s attention, creating a
more reliable motivation to behave in desirable ways) than a less
positive reward. In other words, a more positive reward is a greater attractor. Particularly where there is no learning required for a
stimulus to be rewarding (that is, the stimulus is innately attractive), purposefully using such a stimulus in reinforcement training
takes on a manipulative appearance. Restraint, be it physical or
chemical, and the use of negative reinforcers are options, for many
personnel in laboratory settings, when animals fail to respond to
positive reinforcers (Wolfensohn and Lloyd 2013). It is not clear
whether the animals themselves must be aware that restraint or
negative reinforcers come next for this context of use to take on a
coercive ‘flavor.’ It may be enough that the animals recognize the
stressors upon their presentation but before their use. The clincher
is that the animals do not get to opt out of a procedure or study.
They will be used, with or without their cooperation.
Removing the fly
In previous work, I have been developing an argument for permitting research animals to opt out of laboratory procedures or
participation in laboratory studies. Borrowing a concept from progressive pediatric research ethics, I have defended the claim that
intensely social cognitive animals like chimpanzees can dissent
from research (Fenton 2014; see also Kantin and Wendler 2015).
This claim is easily misunderstood. Unlike informed consent or
even assent, an individual who dissents in the relevant way need
not be able to think abstractly, understand the nature of research

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 23, Issue 1

140
Andrew Fenton

or that it is not therapy, the risks involved, or that they have the
freedom to withdraw at any time. The exemplar of a dissenting individual is a very young, neurotypical human child who is inconsolable when faced with, or struggles to escape from, a research
procedure such as a blood draw. Their sustained dissent – dissent
that persists in spite of assurance or comfort – stops the laboratory procedure or precludes them from further participation in the
relevant study, unless the procedure or study offers possible significant benefits to the subject that are only available through participation (Diekema 2006; Wendler 2006). I have suggested that
the relevant dissent capacity of such a child consists in the capacities to feel distress, pain, or stress, to anticipate its future occurrence, and ‘ask’ that it stop “or express that the relevant distress,
pain, or stress is unwanted” (Fenton 2014, p.134). According to our
best current knowledge of intensely social cognitive animals like
chimpanzees, macaques, and domestic dogs, they possess these
capacities and so qualify as candidate dissenters (see Fenton 2014;
Hau and Schapiro 2007; Stafford 2007). A recent case has been
made for including all vertebrates, though it seems strongest for
mammals and birds (Fenton and Shriver 2018). With a suitably
adjusted background moral framework, such animals as chimpanzees, macaques, and dogs can enjoy this protection extended
to young human children if they express sustained dissent when
faced with, or persist in struggling to escape from, a research procedure.
If dissent as I have described it is in play in contexts where an
animal research subject has been trained to cooperate in research,
then, should they persist in refusing to cooperate when facing a
research procedure, it is not appropriate for laboratory staff or personnel to resort to either negative reinforcers or restraints. Given
the considerations I canvassed above in favor of Donaldson’s and
Kymlicka’s view that PRT is coercive, respecting the sustained

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 23, Issue 1

141
Andrew Fenton

dissent of an intensely social cognitive research animal promises
to morally rehabilitate the practice.
Of course, respecting the sustained dissent of animal research
subjects does not follow from the conservative commitment to
avoid unnecessary harm I mentioned earlier. To see this we need
only recognize that neither the 3Rs nor such considerations as
transparency of results or the curtailment of studies that cause
extreme distress or suffering (e.g., medical testing), justified on
this conservative commitment, undermine the priority of advancing scientific knowledge when pitted against interests of research
animals to live free from distress, pain or stress. Even if my approach to dissent is understood to complement 3R approaches, the
significance of a scientific study can override respecting dissent
should doing so threaten the possibility of it starting or succeeding. To adequately consider questions about the overall justification of advancing scientific knowledge when using other animals,
we need to be willing to depart from conservative animal research
ethics. Appeals to cruelty and kindness, which might offer hope
of remaining ethically conservative in this area of animal use, are
not up for the job. As Rollin has pointed out time and again, it is
a mistake to describe scientific research, even very invasive and
painful research, as cruel (e.g., Rollin 2009). Cruelty minimally
requires an indifference to suffering and the relevant scientific research does not require indifference. Kindness can be reasonably
understood to intersect with acting humanely and this brings us
back to such ethical frameworks as the 3Rs.
The fundamental problem here is anthropocentric speciesism,
as it supports the use of animals even when violating interests relevantly similar to our own. A common contention in animal ethics
is that anthropocentric speciesism is unjustified or, to put it less
diplomatically, immoral. Defending the contention is relatively
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straightforward. First, we have good human-related reasons to reject it. Various reasonable commitments to women’s reproductive
rights, including late term abortions (with or without the sanction
of law), seem to run afoul of anthropocentric speciesism (Fenton
2012). Second, reasonably strong views of the nature of ethics,
seem to clinch it. DeGrazia’s thought experiments using now extinct earlier humans, such as Homo erectus or Homo floresiensis,
remind us of the arbitrariness of favoring members of our own
species (DeGrazia 2007). Thought experiments defending our
duty to sapient extraterrestrials or artificial intelligence remind
us that stopping at the ‘boundaries’ of our genus is not acceptable (Carbone 2004). Though fraught with difficulties (Sapontzis
1987), well crafted ‘burning hospital’ thought experiments should
defend the judgment that, all other things being equal, it would
be wrong to save an endangered frozen embryo over the hospital
cat (be she sapient or not) from the inferno. The importance of a
move away from anthropocentric speciesism does not stand or fall
on sympathies with other animals around us. Arbitrariness is antithetical to views of ethics as objective. Anthropocentric speciesism arbitrarily favors members of our species. If ethics is objective, we must reject this speciesism.
There are cracks in the veneer of what one might be tempted to
think is a widespread sympathy with anthropocentric speciesism
outside the academy. Quite apart from support for reproductive
rights, only benighted or misanthropic guardians of such companion animals as cats and dogs adopt these animals in ignorance
of, or indifference to, how their otherwise disposable income
could be used to benefit other humans in need. Continued care
for their nonhuman companions, particularly when, as is often
the case with veterinary care, it is pricey, testifies to the moral
weight of particular relationships over more abstract appeals to
human solidarity (Gruen 2011). Rather than this being a failure of
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moral agency, it can be understood to reflect the substantive commitment of these guardians to the animals they adopt. Arguably,
no one should adopt such animals without this commitment as, if
they did, it is difficult to see how these animals would receive adequate care. Such a failure would violate even a conservative commitment to avoid unnecessary harm. Importantly for my purposes
here, it is difficult to see how a decision to so care for an animal
can cohere with the commitments of a reflective anthropocentric
speciesist.
A non-anthropocentric speciesist framework is not as radical
as it may sound. Various members of human communities can
enjoy priority over other (though not all other) animals without being speciesist. Human exceptionalism is an unsuccessful attempt
to defend this view. Proponents favor ethical analyses that foreground psychological capacities thought to be uniquely human
as necessary for the moral status many humans currently enjoy
(Livingstone Smith 2013). It encounters problems for two reasons:
the humans it seeks to protect, and our best knowledge of the capacities of some other animals. As long as human exceptionalism seeks to prioritize the interests of all humans from birth to
death, as many proponents are inclined to do, it seems to fall victim to arbitrariness. This is not to say that this kind of anthropocentricism has been a wholly bad thing. Anthropocentricism has
helped ableists see the ethically significant capacities possessed by
neuroatypical individuals. Once so attuned, we see the palpable
results: the preferences of neuroatypical individuals have been
enjoying increasing significance in how our shared spaces are designed or maintained. That said, such anthropocentricism ignores
morally significant capacities possessed by other animals and so
violates formal justice (where like should be regarded alike). That
other animals should matter under an inclusive moral framework
(that is, a framework that moves beyond restricting moral consid-
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erablility to those possessing complex cognitive capacities (e.g.,
an ability to reason abstractly, master a natural language)) should
not be surprising. If all living humans are morally considerable,
then it is likely that the relevant capacities will range over a wide
variety of cognitive capacities relevant to the emergence of various conscious states or levels of awareness (from, say, an awareness of, and readiness to engage, the surrounding world through
to self-awareness). It should take little convincing to point out relevantly similar, or equally significant, capacities among animals
like chimpanzees or macaques (see some of the references already
cited). This reflects not only the work of such primatologists as
Jane Goodall (e.g., Goodall 1988) and Frans de Waal (e.g., de Waal
1990), but the success of disseminating their findings through popular media. Much the same can be said for many other mammals,
birds, and perhaps fish (Andrews 2015; Fenton and Shriver 2018).
Once these similar, or equally significant, psychological capacities are recognized, the arbitrariness of prioritizing only humans
is apparent (Taylor 2011). Note, however, that a rejection of human
exceptionalism does not “open the flood gates.” Though such animals as chimpanzees or macaques can enjoy new prominence in
a non-anthropocentric moral framework, it is unclear how many
other animals will or should. Much will depend on what capacities
are taken to matter ethically.
For the sake of my overall argument, it is not necessary to settle
that issue. A rejection of anthropocentric speciesism and human
exceptionalism can add significant weight to the sustained dissent of animals like chimpanzees or macaques. Without further,
non-arbitrary considerations to preclude this re-weighting, and I
know of none that do not fall afoul of the proper regard due diverse
members of our own communities, we can re-enter the main discussion where I concluded that PRT need not be coercive.
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More on transitions
My focus on laboratory animals precludes using, at least unmodified, the citizenship-related categories of Donaldson and
Kymlicka’s Zoopolean framework (Donaldson and Kymlicka
2011). There are three: co-citizenship, denizenship, and status as
a sovereign nation. Co-citizenship is directed at animals who we
have brought into our societies, gradually changed to better fit
their circumstances and our needs, and made dependent on our
care and humane treatment. Denizenship is directed at animals
who ‘choose’ to live, or remain, in proximity to human homes,
towns, and cities. They are not, or are no longer, domesticated
and either not dependent or differently dependent on us (e.g., they
may depend on our waste rather than direct feeding or provision
of shelter). The status of a sovereign nation is directed at populations of free-living animals who tend to avoid human presence
and occupy discrete territories. Though each category assumes a
shared set of negative duties that seek to protect the lives and general welfare of sentient animals, they also have distinct positive
duties fixed by the nature of the relationship between animals and
humans. Co-citizenship, for example, brings with it positive duties
of care, to properly socialize, and accommodate the relevant animals’ interests in how we run or design our societies. Denizenship
brings with it duties to ensure co-existence, including the design
of spaces geared toward the accommodation of particular basic
needs of survival. Recognizing populations of free-living animals as sovereign carries duties of respect directed at territorial
boundaries or resources within said territories as well as efforts
to protect the independent functioning of the relevant nonhuman
communities (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011).
Clearly, neither the status of sovereign-nation nor denizen apply
to populations of laboratory animals. Such populations are neither
free to live independent of human presence nor do they seek out
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human habitation. Co-citizens, at least as they are understood post
the forty year Tuskegee syphilis study (Jones 2008), the Jewish
Chronic Disease Hospital scandal in New York (Arras 2008), or
the mid-century nutrition studies at Canadian residential schools
(Mosby 2013), should not be intentionally endangered or seriously
harmed, nor should the expression of their agency be unnecessarily curtailed. As it currently stands, research animals are not treated as co-citizens and, without a radical re-framing of our moral
frameworks in ways that reflect a strong non-anthropocentric
stance, that is unlikely to change any time soon.
Sanctuaried (‘retired’) or rehomed research animals are interesting exceptions. Though the chimpanzees retired (or to be retired) from research in the US are benefiting from several factors
(e.g., advances in alternative models, failures of chimpanzee models, reclassification as an endangered species (NIH 2013; Collins
2015)), this was not a victory for animal rights so much as a consistent application of 3R-based policy. It was, after all, the lack of
the necessity of chimpanzee models to advance the biomedical
sciences, rather than any special status accorded these nonhuman
great apes, that played the central role in their retirement (Kahn
2014). Importantly for this discussion, it looks as though, once
retired, these chimpanzees will not, at any future time, re-enter
research. Rehomed research animals who are no longer useful to
research but are not euthanized, such as some domestic cats and
dogs, find retirement as companion animals (Yeager 2018). Again,
these animals are unlikely to re-enter research. Together, these animals have moved from a status unclassified within an undiluted
Zoopolean framework (or at least a status like captive or prisoner)
to something resembling co-citizenship status. In each case, the
preferences of the individuals take on much greater significance
and can inform the shape of their new physical and social environ-
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ments (including the terms or conditions of their interactions with
humans).
Of the positive categories used by Donaldson and Kymlicka,
co-citizenship is the least dissimilar to the actual conditions of existence experienced by research animals. Indeed, some elements
of Donaldson’s and Kymlicka’s co-citizenship status can apply
to some research animals in contexts where their interests are no
longer assessed through an anthropocentric lens. Intensely social
cognitive animals possessing the capacities that mark them as candidate dissenters should enjoy certain protections. If we are committed to meaningfully respecting the dissent capacity of these
research animals, care must be taken not to destroy it, preclude its
re-acquisition when lost, or fail to protect its emergence among the
young (Fenton 2018). This places even greater importance on enrichment efforts that are increasingly standard in North American
laboratories. This can be re-seen as a re-shaping of research environments to reflect the needs and preferences of research animals.
PRT also takes on greater significance, as a protective measure
that helps research animals deal with laboratory stressors. Such a
protective measure complements enrichment efforts to offset the
otherwise damaging effects of this kind of captivity. What’s more,
PRT can be re-seen as a form of socialization that helps these research animals better fit their captivity. Respecting the dissent of
animals trained with PR deepens the ways in which their preferences positively affect their laboratory environments. So understood, there will be an increasing resemblance of this context of
use to Donaldson and Kymlicka’s co-citizenship category.

Conclusions
Where has this journey taken us? I have explored a diluted
Zoopolean framework with a particular focus on research animals. This was in part to see whether such a framework can avoid
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adopting a strong animal rights position, as Donaldson and Kymlicka contend, and also to see how such a framework intersects
with a controversial but largely socially acceptable use of animals
that does not fit Donaldson and Kymlicka’s undiluted approach.
I have suggested that certain laboratory practices, in particular
PRT when coupled with my dissent approach, holds out hope of
changing laboratory settings in ways that resemble Donaldson and
Kymlicka’s category of co-citizenship, though only when the moral frameworks governing our use of research animals are purged
of anthropocentric biases. Perhaps this shows in a small way how
a diluted Zoopolean framework can serve as an intermediary between the status quo and an undiluted Zoopolis, where sentient
animals enjoy lives free of unwanted human presence and anthropogenic suffering.
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